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The power and significance of artwork in shaping human cognition is self-evident. The
starting point for our empirical investigations is the view that the task of neuroscience
is to integrate itself with other forms of knowledge, rather than to seek to supplant
them. In our recent work, we examined a particular aspect of the appreciation of artwork
using present-day functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Our results emphasized
the continuity between viewing artwork and other human cognitive activities. We also
showed that appreciation of a particular aspect of artwork, namely authenticity, depends
upon the co-ordinated activity between the brain regions involved in multiple decision
making and those responsible for processing visual information. The findings about brain
function probably have no specific consequences for understanding how people respond
to the art of Rembrandt in comparison with their response to other artworks. However,
the use of images of Rembrandt’s portraits, his most intimate and personal works, clearly
had a significant impact upon our viewers, even though they have been spatially confined
to the interior of an MRI scanner at the time of viewing. Neuroscientific studies of humans
viewing artwork have the capacity to reveal the diversity of human cognitive responses
that may be induced by external advice or context as people view artwork in a variety of
frameworks and settings.
Keywords: art, Rembrandt, fMRI, authenticity, cortical response properties
Shortly after the Tate Modern art gallery in London opened, it was reported that more people in the
UK went to museums and galleries than attended football matches (Travers, 2006). At more than
5 million people in 2012 alone for the exhibits of modern art in the Tate, the level of interest is
evident. Of course, crude numbers do not tell us anything directly about the quality of the art on
exhibit, but a number like this is impressive to a biologist. With more than 20 million visitors in 5
years, a sizable fraction of the UK population has visited this one location.
Each person who goes to a gallery such as the Tate expends a good deal of resources (money,
food, time) simply to view objects. Biologists would always consider behavioral activity of this kind
as indicative of fundamental choices. If resources are being expended on visiting galleries and view-
ing art, they are not available for other competing activities. Considered merely as materials, the
art objects in the gallery are not very valuable in themselves. They are predominantly composed of
wood, canvas, plastic, acrylic or oil paints, glass, stone, concrete, fabrics, and so on. These are all
common-place materials, well within the household budgets of the visitors. Objects like Damien
Hirst’s diamond-encrusted skull are exceptions, holding some of their shock value as artworks
because they depart from normality.
What is special about art objects is the way in which the materials have been configured to
make certain visual impressions. These impressions are clearly attractive and meaningful to lots of
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people: the numbers above are enough to convince of this.
Biologists are then obliged to think about this in the following
way. The impressions created by the artworks are sufficiently val-
ued as experiences to compensate for the expenditure of resources
(time, effort, money), bearing in mind that these resources could
be equally well-applied to serving basic biological needs such
as nutrition or reproduction. There is a choice to be made and
many people are choosing to expend their biological resources on
viewing artwork.
There are several factors that combine to bring about this
situation. First, the resources expended on viewing artwork are
not needed for allocation to basic biological needs. Second, the
reward, pleasure or excitement from viewing artwork is sufficient
to merit a claim upon a fraction of the available resources, in
competition with other possible activities. In mentioning reward
or pleasure here, we do not want to be limited to positive affec-
tive states. Art also conveys and manipulates negative emotional
responses, such as fear, disgust, and anxiety, and works of art that
successfully excite viewers in this way gain a great deal of attention
and analysis. For both positive and negative affective states, choice
is at the center of this framework, such that decisions are made to
engage in a limited number of activities out of a potentially wider
set that is available.
The other component of people’s choices that is of interest to
biologists is the visual content itself. Put simply, what is special
about the visual content of artworks? Is the special nature of art-
works fully captured by the visual impressions that they create?
Questions such as this are superficially simple but become more
complex as we think about possible answers. Certainly, the visual
neuroscientist will want to know whether the visual impressions
created by artwork are in anyway distinguishable from the visual
impressions created by objects or scenes that are not considered to
be artwork. There probably is no hard boundary between objects
that are “art” and those that are not, but this does not make the
question unapproachable. Figure 1 illustrates one of the uncom-
fortable issues that might be posed in this domain. Each of the
half-images presents a portion of an artistic work that is plausibly
a portrait by Rembrandt: indeed the each of the original paint-
ings has at some time been accepted as a genuine Rembrandt. The
one on the left is currently acknowledged as genuine, whereas the
one on the right is now more disputed. Clearly, the visual impres-
sions from the disputed portrait do not vary as the experts argue
back and forth; however, equally clearly, the portrait’s status as an
artwork is affected by the outcome of these discussions.
Turning the question the other way, there has been a great deal
of interest broadly within arts and humanities about whether neu-
roscientific knowledge, particularly cognitive neuroscience, offers
insights into the questions that have been their long-standing
preoccupations: literary theory, artistic appreciation, theory of
knowledge, philology and linguistics, and so forth. Debating these
issues is not simply an abstracted and theoretical discussion,
removed from everyday concerns. One may point to the role of
psychology and cognitive neuroscience in shaping our under-
standing of humanmemory and recollection. This understanding
has fed into practical situations such as the reliability of witnesses
in legal cases. Personal statements from witnesses, based on their
presumed faithful recollections, would have been at the center
FIGURE 1 | A chimera image of a portions of a pair of Rembrandt
self-portraits: one half image is from a genuine self-portrait by
Rembrandt (Norton Simon Museum of Fine Art, Pasadena); the other
half image is from a portrait attributed to Rembrandt (Museo
Thyssen-Bornemisza, Madrid), whose authenticity has been hotly
debated among experts for more than 40 years, see pp. 361–370 in
(van de Wetering, 2005). Chimera image prepared by Martin Kemp.
of criminal prosecutions some 50–60 years ago, whereas now the
rise of forensic technology and the demonstrated unreliability of
humanmemory under some circumstances have promoted a shift
away from the centrality of personal witness.
NEUROSCIENCE AND ART
The attempt to fuse neuroscientific insights with mainstream art
theory has led in a number of directions, not all of them wel-
comed by scholars of art history and critical theory. The most
direct confrontation has been generated over the idea that neu-
roscientists might be able to identify a specific region of the brain
that is associated with the appreciation of beauty. For example,
Kawabata and Zeki (2004) asked people to rate different art-
works (paintings) as beautiful, neutral, or ugly; the participants
then viewed those same paintings whilst lying inside a mag-
netic resonance imaging system (brain scanner) that registered
the changes in functional blood flow that arise as different parts
of the brain’s neural tissue becomes active. The authors found
that different parts of the brain were activated by images rated
as beautiful in comparison with images rated as ugly, although
some other brain regions were activated by beautiful or ugly
but not by neutral images. This approach can be imaginatively
extended to include less familiar esthetic judgments. Recent work
has approached the question of why and how mathematically
sophisticated observers find certain mathematical expressions to
be elegant and esthetically pleasing (Zeki et al., 2014).
This work has been extended away from functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) (Munar et al., 2012) with a variety
of approaches, some of which have looked at gender differences
in the brain responses (Cela-Conde et al., 2009), whereas others
have sought to peel apart different aspects of the visual experi-
ence, examining the link between visual symmetry and beauty
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(Jacobsen et al., 2006) and contrasting the judgment of beauty
with that of “naturalness” and more direct physical qualities of
the visual object, such as surface roughness (Jacobs et al., 2012).
Some of these studies have used visual objects that are cer-
tainly interesting and engaging to look at but might not qualify
as art-works by most standards, in that they are images gener-
ated by a computer, rather than created by a person—of course,
there can be art produced with computing techniques, but the
resulting products (images, sounds, 3-D printed objects) pass
through a stage of appraisal by the artist, followed by rejection
or selection.
KEY CONCEPT 1 | Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is a technique that measures
the oxygenation level of cerebral blood flow to make inferences about neural
activity changes that are localized to particular sites in the brain.
The more serious attack on this approach has been concep-
tual. It is argued that a single rating of esthetic quality does not
adequately capture the human understanding of, and response to,
works of art. In designing a recent study of our own (Huang et al.,
2011), this seemed to be an overriding reason for not pursuing
that line of enquiry. For example, some works of art gain their
dominance and power because of the strength of the image, rather
than its beauty alone (Figure 2). We do not look at the “The
Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Nicolaes Tulp” by Rembrandt van Rijn
just to admire the beauty of the corpse. Rather we are drawn into
this scene of flesh and corporality also to look at the status of the
members of the surgeon’s guild and Dr. Tulp himself, particularly
comparing them with the unfortunate who has recently died by
execution. As has been pointed out many times, from many dif-
ferent sources of evidence—for example IJpma et al. (2006)—this
is not a realistic depiction of an anatomical dissection. Thus, this
artwork is not a simple piece of photographic reportage. Neither
has it been created just to produce a beautiful object for modern-
day viewers to contemplate in an art gallery. At least one purpose
in its time was to memorialize the persons in the picture, who can
all be identified by name—information, which is carefully embed-
ded for us within the picture, written upon the piece of paper
held by the man at the back. So this picture, like many others, is
not photographically naturalistic; the scene has been dramatized
and arranged to gain impact and significance on behalf of those
commissioning the original artwork.
KEY CONCEPT 2 | Rembrandt van Rijn
Rembrandt van Rijn (1606–1669) is one of the most famous Dutch artists of
all time. Working in Amsterdam, he is particularly known for his portraits.
From the point of view of the biologist then, the understanding
of the significance of artworks might appear to become more of a
question of sociobiology rather than a pure visual analysis of the
optical content of the artwork. In the strictest form, this would
suggest that the conceptual approach to artwork should be taken
as dominant. One would then conclude that any comments made
by biologists should be focused on the thought patterns lead-
ing up to production of artworks, rather than the visual content
of the artworks. This is certainly an important warning against
naïvely looking at artworks as visual objects, without consider-
ing how and why they came to be created. On the other hand, the
FIGURE 2 | Reproduction of “The Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Nicolaes
Tulp” (1632), Rembrandt van Rijn:’s-Gravenhage, Mauritshuis,
Netherlands. Image in public domain.
artworks we are considering here, specifically the Rembrandt por-
traits used in our study, are intended to be viewed, as opposed to
being heard or read, so the choice of a visual medium for express-
ing the artist’s ideas and feelings is thoroughly embedded in the
production.
THE VISUAL CONTENT OF ART
Whilst we have already set aside the goal of a direct assault on
measuring correlates of the esthetic content of artwork, arguing
that esthetic content is not a single scale of beauty, the question
remains of whether art differs visually from “non-art” and, if so,
in what way does it differ. It may be of course that such differences
do not really exist, at least not in a categorical form.
A number of direct attempts have been made, either to classify
art according to broadly defined historical styles (Wallraven et al.,
2009) or to test whether an artwork is genuine or fake (Gerhard
and Bethge, 2014), a question closely related to the one explored
below. These approaches use statistical classification, either to
train a machine-learning computer algorithm or to train human
observers, to discriminate or categorize digital images of artwork.
As an exercise in demonstrating what information may be avail-
able from digitized versions of artworks, these approaches are very
valuable. For example, such methods may well reveal differences,
to which expert viewers are sensitive but find the nature of those
differences to be very difficult to articulate.
These approaches are limited however. They rely very largely
on low-level details within the images, such as the texturing or
color palette in use. Notably, these approaches lack semantic con-
tent, so it is difficult to see that they will capture all the dimensions
of artwork that would be of interest. Their strength is similar to
analytical methods that rely on spectroscopy of pigments, X-ray
photo of images that underlie the surface or analysis of canvas
or other incidental materials. These measurements are objective,
thus usefully discriminating one art object from another, but they
do not reveal much about the existence of any critical differences
between art and non-art.
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Another reference point for considering the visual content of
artworks is the stream of everyday images that are formed on our
retinas. This visual content has been analyzed extensively, largely
because there are strong theoretical grounds for expecting that
our visual systems have been adaptively shaped to deal with the
statistics of so-called natural images (Ruderman and Bialek, 1994;
van der Schaaf and van Hateren, 1996; van Hateren and van der
Schaaf, 1998; Koenderink and van Doorn, 2003). Since a good
deal of the statistics of the natural world images is shared with
the statistics of those artificial images which are artworks, little
progress has been made in revealing anything special about art
through this route. Indeed, it is possible to invert the explana-
tory reasoning here and suggest that if the visual system is indeed
adapted to the statistical content of natural images, then suc-
cessful artwork might well have very similar statistical content
simply because the artwork is being designed for viewing by visual
systems adapted in this particular way.
NEUROSCIENCE AS A METHODOLOGICAL TOOL
These various points led us to advocate a position in which, rather
than using neuroscience to attempt to supplant earlier and more
established forms of scholarship, neuroscience might be put to
better use, if it were to address questions that are interesting to
art historians and connoisseurs. These would be questions that
are regularly debated and figure centrally in discussions about
art works. An example of this is the assignment of authenticity:
in other words, “Is this artwork a genuine Rembrandt, Picasso,
Goya?” This is a question that art experts are regularly asked to
resolve. A wide variety of techniques and disciplines contribute
to these decisions: these range across “hard science” measure-
ments of chemistry of pigments, historical documents about the
art work, identification of interior or exterior locations of the
artist’s activity, comparative judgments with established artworks
from the same artist and so on.
KEY CONCEPT 3 | Authenticity
Authenticity is the degree of confidence provided by art experts that a work
of art has been genuinely created and prepared by a known artist. Artworks
may be not authentic for a variety of reasons, such as similar artworks by
lesser-known contemporaries of the artist, copies of artworks made without
any intent to deceive and fakes where a forgery has been attempted.
Decisions about authenticity are not just significant for the
experts in ensuring that the history of their field is correctly writ-
ten. A discovery of a new artwork by an established famous artist
is an event that often captivates the headlines of themedia and has
a profound impact on the monetary value of the artwork and its
public esteem. This public esteem is something that drives a great
deal of human activity, well beyond a simple auction fight to own
a genuine masterwork. As noted earlier, people expend a great
deal of time, resources and effort in viewing original authentic
artworks in galleries, located far from their homes.
THE GALLERY EXPERIENCE
Visiting galleries can appear to be a deeply puzzling activity, since
the reasons why the actual experience is in any way satisfying can
be remote. Consider the gallery at the Louvre where theMona Lisa
is located: the room is typically full with people, such that the view
of the artwork is limited; many people view the painting through
the medium of their digital camera; the painting is itself pro-
tected with bullet-proof glass. Despite all these limitations, there
is no lack of new enthusiasts who clearly desire the experience
of walking into the gallery in which the authenticated master-
piece is located. In the gallery, the label on the wall next to the
painting, which summarizes the combined views of many schol-
ars, assigns huge power and significance to the art object that it
sits beside. Whilst viewing the Mona Lisa itself is almost a carica-
ture of the gallery visit, the power of viewing the authentic work
is the experience we wished to tap into in designing our study.
Authentication of artworks by experts has a clear influence on the
experience expected and felt during gallery visits: we wondered
what the consequence of such attribution might be within a brain
imaging experiment (Huang et al., 2011).
Clearly, bringing the experience of viewing out of the gallery
into the laboratory carries with it a number of limitations. One
can at least maintain the experience of viewing major artworks
by a world-renowned artist, but many aspects of the viewing
experience are markedly different (Nessim, 1997). The images are
presented on a computer/TV display, so they can never be iden-
tical with viewing the real artworks in the controlled lighting of
a gallery. The person lies supine in a brain scanner to view the
images and the advice about whether the image is a rendition of
an authentic artwork is delivered aurally, to avoid any visual stim-
ulation associated with the content of the advice. This means that
the observer is more a passive receiver of visual content rather
than an active explorer within a large physical environment.
Before becoming too concerned about the effect of remov-
ing artworks from galleries on the viewers’ experience, it should
be recalled that not all artworks were created with the inten-
tion of displaying them in an art gallery, as conceived in the
modern sense. The Anatomical Lesson (Figure 2) was commis-
sioned so that it could be exhibited within the Guild Room of
the Amsterdam Guild of Surgeons. It is also surprising but true
that the time spent by individuals in looking at individual paint-
ings in a gallery setting is quite short, some 15–30 s being typical
(Smith and Smith, 2001). Hence, presentation of a controlled
sequence of images for durations similar to these will not be far
removed from the temporal sequences chosen by many viewers
in the gallery context. Another approach, which allows work-
ing in the gallery space itself and we have implemented in other
work (Khoshdel, 2012), is to make use of recent developments
in portable monitoring equipment, which can take psychophys-
iological measurements (heart rate, breathing, skin conductance
response, eye and head position to measure gaze) as a person is
moving freely (Locher, 2011).
EXPERTS AND THEIR TRAINING
One of the more fundamental decisions to be made in any study
of this kind is to consider who will be the participants. There are
strong arguments for exploring responses of expert viewers, as
in Pihko et al. (2011). Experts may be expected to be the most
highly trained viewers of the artwork and therefore they might
exhibit the most highly differentiated brain responses. The main
methodological issue about studying the brains of experts is that
their expertise is often highly particular. This is especially true
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in the art field, in which some experts may be driven by their
knowledge of the history of the times and the cultural signifi-
cance of the artwork in that context, whereas other experts may
have detailed technical knowledge about the methods of prepara-
tion and construction of the work of art. At least some expertise
is difficult, sometimes impossible, to articulate: an example very
often quoted is that of determining the sex of day-old chickens,
which has for many years been a highly specialized employment
(Biederman and Shiffrar, 1987). This means that it can be diffi-
cult to gather together a group of individual experts who hold a
consistent domain of expertise.
Even the terminology is apt to be confusing here. One recent
research study Pang et al. (2013) defined expertise with reference
to a questionnaire that certainly evaluates awareness of and sen-
sitivity to the production and evaluation of artwork, but does
not probe differences as subtle as those between a specialist in
Rembrandt and a specialist in the Impressionists. Indeed, the gen-
eral outcome of that questionnaire is that a fraction of the people
tested in Huang et al. (2011) would be “expert” by the crite-
ria of Pang et al. (2013). The alternative approach attempts to
embrace the particularity of expertise; for example, by arranging
for brain scanning of an individual artist during the production
of artwork and comparing the brain activations with those from
a “non-artist” (Solso, 2000). Although this work is pioneering,
studies of this kind will have to embrace understanding about
the nature of expertise from other research in psychology and
neuroscience, as well as a considerable improvement in the reli-
ability of signals from human brain scanners, before progress can
be made.
For our own study, fortunate timing was offered by the current
state-of-affairs in the scholarship of Rembrandt portrait paint-
ings. There has been a fundamental restatement of attributions
of artworks to Rembrandt in the last few years (van Sonnenburg,
1995; Seinstra, 2010). To all but the experts, the decision about
which is a “real Rembrandt” and which is a fake is a matter on
which recent advice rather than past knowledge must be predom-
inant. There are several portrait paintings that have had until
recently the status of genuine works by the great master but are
now regarded as inauthentic at some level or other. These circum-
stances make it relatively easy to create an experimental design
in which some participants experienced a painting under the
advice that it is genuine whilst others receive the advice that the
same portrait is a fake. (No person saw the same portrait paint-
ing twice under different advice conditions.) Since the context is
important, we carefully prepared a script for each participant that
explained what was meant by “fake,” noting for our study that
this everything that is not genuine: misattributed works; copies
made by admirers of Rembrandt with no intent to pass them off
as genuine; as well as outright forgeries. The same script deliv-
ered historical information about Rembrandt and his artworks,
with the intent of bringing participants’ knowledge to a level
playing-field.
The circumstances created by the significant number of
Rembrandt portraits and the uncertainty surrounding their
authenticity created a special opportunity. It was for this reason
and a number of others (related to the complexity of the pic-
torial content) that we avoided the use of artworks such as that
the Rembrandt in Figure 2. It seemed to us that the overrid-
ing issues is that it is difficult to design experiments in which
all members of a group of participants have similar levels of
expertise. By its very nature, expertise varies with the past his-
tory of the individual. Nonetheless, understanding the nature of
expertise, particularly as it applies directly to the appraisal of art-
work, is a question that is of interest to the art professionals and
historians.
BRAIN REGIONS INVOLVED IN RESPONDING TO
AUTHENTICITY
Neuroscientists have identified a number of substantive divisions
of function between different areas of the human brain. Until
fairly recently, this work progressed by the patient acquisition of
insights from studying individuals who have suffered damage to
specific regions of the brain. Nowadays, the use of modern imag-
ing techniques has greatly accelerated this field of activity. One of
the questions that was open before our study is whether there are
separate, as yet unidentified, regions of the brain that would be
responsive in our task involving artwork.
Broadly speaking, this question was answered in the nega-
tive. Whilst there are interesting activations in response to the
instruction that “this painting is authentic” and separate activa-
tions in response to the opposite instruction that “this painting
is a copy,” the brain regions involved are fairly familiar. When
the “authentic” instruction was issued, the orbitofrontal cortex
was mildly activated. This cortical region has been identified as
involved in the receipt and acknowledgment of rewarding stimuli,
in a variety of contexts from pleasant-tasting food (Rolls, 2000)
to gambling tasks (Camille et al., 2004). This is consistent with
the idea that the subjects in our task found it more rewarding to
view an image proclaimed as a genuine, authentic Rembrandt, as
opposed to an image that was labeled as derivative.
KEY CONCEPT 4 | Orbito-frontal cortex
Orbito-frontal cortex is part of the cerebral cortex close to the front of the
head known to respond to highly rewarding stimuli.
The activations generated by the advice that the image is a
“copy” were more complex. A number of brain regions (pre-
cuneus, middle frontal gyrus, and fronto-polar cortex) were
involved, but the most striking of these was the activation of
fronto-polar cortex, as its activation is given some insight by con-
sidering the verbal reports of our participants. They mentioned
that the advice that the artwork was a “copy” reliably induced
within them a train of thought that questioned in which regard
the displayed artwork was less than genuine. In other words, they
began to run through a set of possible options or hypotheses that
would reveal the works as fake. This is the sequence of thought
processes that has been shown in other contexts to unleash fronto-
polar activations (Koechlin and Hyafil, 2007), as policy options
are evaluated and discarded.
KEY CONCEPT 5 | Fronto-polar cortex
Fronto-polar cortex is a part of the cerebral cortex that lies at the front of
the head in the part of the skull just above the eye sockets. The functions of
front-polar cortex are still poorly understood, but it is regarded as important
in the ability to engage in high-level cognitive planning and strategic thinking.
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Most interesting were the activations of the occipital cortex.
Here there was no significant difference in activation between
the two conditions in which different advice about the artwork
was issued. Since the occipital regions are very much the pri-
mary input to the brain for visual information, this suggests that
there was no fundamental difference in the effect of the advice
on the visual responses. As well as standing in its own right as
an observation, this also suggests that neither of the two different
conditions unleashed different levels of attention, which if present
would expect to be manifest at the level of occipital cortex. What
did happen however was a closer coupling between the activa-
tions of fronto-polar cortex and occipital cortex during the “copy”
condition: the response of each region is variable but under the
“copy” condition there is a greater tendency for the two regions
to vary together (co-vary). We cannot determine a direction of
causation from this type of measurement, but it is reasonable in
the light of other knowledge about the functions of these brain
regions to view this enhanced co-variation as being driven from
fronto-polar cortex to occipital cortex. On this view, the enhanced
co-variation would be a correlate of the hypothesis-sifting activ-
ity of fronto-polar cortex, as it sends signals to occipital cortex to
validate or reject the currently active hypothesis.
KEY CONCEPT 6 | Occipital cortex
Occipital cortex is a part of the cerebral cortex that lies at the back of the
head underneath the occipital bone. This region of cortex contains the major
cortical sites involved in processing visual information.
Our results therefore highlight two points. First, the brain
regions activated in some aspects of the appreciation of art,
specifically its authenticity, are also involved in many other cog-
nitive and emotional responses. This emphasizes the continu-
ity between the appreciation of art and other human cognitive
behavior, rather than regarding the appreciation of visual art
as being a human activity that is unique and may be there-
fore expected to have distinct and separate brain regions asso-
ciated with it. Second, the responses in the “copy” condition,
which involve close co-ordination between brain regions that
are widely separated anatomically, emphasize the significance of
whole brain, integrated responses to artworks. Specifically, in
this case, the interaction is not manifest in the response of a
single brain region, but requires analysis of the co-variation of
activity between different brain regions to reveal this. Whilst
our experiments do not directly address the question of whether
there is a brain region, whose activity correlates with the esthetic
appreciation of artworks, it is evident from observation of
human activity alone that the search for viewings of authen-
tic works is a major influence on the esthetic response. The
fact that the brain responses here are manifest by means of
an interaction between brain regions, rather than the activation
of a single brain region, suggests that other esthetic responses
may depend upon coherent activity across many areas of the
human brain.
DIVIDING THE AUTHENTIC FROM THE FAKE
As a footnote, the following point may be noted.Within our study
is also the capacity to ask a significant question about the authen-
ticity of the artwork itself. Recall that the design of the experiment
resulted in each image, which was either real or fake, being viewed
under two conditions, with advice that it was authentic or the
opposite. Although the people taking part in the study showed
no evidence of being able to distinguish the real from the fake
artwork, we wondered whether their cortical responses might
be able to signal something that they could not report explic-
itly. Discovering of a reliable way of distinguishing real from fake
artwork would of course make us rich beyond the dreams of aca-
demics! However, we found only the slightest difference in cortical
response that distinguished the artwork itself. This difference was
confined to the occipital regions, as opposed to the activations
induced by advice about authenticity of the artworks, which was
described earlier. Curiously, this small differential response was
primarily due to a difference in the responses of left and right
occipital cortex, strongly suggesting that this differential response
was driven by low-level differences in the image structure of the
artwork. In the case of portraits, this would be for example a dif-
ference in the left-right symmetry of the images that were used in
our study. This is an important methodological issue for the use
of artwork in brain imaging studies, which is that it is very dif-
ficult to match a meaningful stimulus set at all possible levels of
description. The use of portraits in one artistic style reduced these
incidental differences as much as possible.
CONCLUSION
It is perhaps unsurprising that what people themselves think
about art has an influence upon their brain responses. What has
been shown here is that what people are invited to think about
art also has profound effects upon their brain responses. The
conduct of imaging studies inevitably produces many possible
factors that need to be appreciated and brought under experi-
mental control. In designing future neuroscience studies about
the human response to visual art, it becomes important to plan
for and embrace the reality that even non-directed and inno-
cently provided forms of advice may have a profound effect on the
brain responses of participants. Whilst the research undertaken
here has probably revealed little about the response of people to
the art of Rembrandt, the use of portraits, being Rembrandt’s
most intimate and personal works, has clearly had a significant
impact upon our viewers, even though they have been spatially
confined to the interior of an MRI scanner at the time of viewing.
The impact of the advice about authenticity would presumably
have been far weaker, if the same advice had been issued about
unknown artwork of little cultural significance.
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